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Germany’s stance on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank has evolved over the last two years. 
Berlin agreed to make collective defence a priority for NATO once again and consented to 
a greater allied presence in Poland and the Baltic states. Germany continues however to express 
reservations and is attempting to limit the scope of NATO’s engagement. The overall change in 
Germany’s policy was due to several reasons. In the last two years Germany has ceased to per-
ceive Russia as a partner and begun instead to view it as a challenge to the security of Europe. 
Germany has also been pressed hard by its allies – the USA, Poland and the Baltic states - to 
change its position within NATO and to increase its military engagement on the eastern flank. 
Berlin has thus gradually expanded its military presence in the region – also in part so it may 
maintain its credibility within the alliance. However, Germany still eyes its military involvement 
on the eastern flank more along the lines of reassuring its allies than of deterring Russia. 
In recent years, German politicians have openly spoken of Germany taking the lead in Europe-
an security policy. Due to the American rebalance to Asia-Pacific and continued involvement 
in the Middle East, the administration of President Barack Obama would like to vest greater 
political and military responsibility for European security in Germany. Berlin’s ability to play 
this role does, though, have real limitations. The political consensus between the Social Demo-
crats and the Christian Democrats over Germany’s policy in NATO (strengthening the eastern 
flank) and in the EU (maintaining sanctions against Russia) is crumbling ahead of parliamen-
tary elections in 2017. The increasing energy dependence on Russia intensified by the Nord 
Stream 2 project is not being debated in the security policy context in Berlin. And the relative 
weakness of the German military is likely to remain in the short – and mid-term perspective. 
The planned increases in defence spending and changes to the reform of the Bundeswehr, are 
insufficient, when compared with the needs. 
Between reassurance, deterrence  
and dialogue with Russia
Before 2014, collective defence was NATO’s most 
important task in Germany’s rhetoric. In practice, 
however, Germany opposed or was sceptical to-
wards any initiatives to bolster NATO’s ability to 
defend the eastern flank states (such as updating 
contingency plans, military exercises based on 
a collective defence scenario) put forward by 
Poland and the Baltic states in the face of Rus-
sia’s increased defence spending, military ac-
tivity in the Nordic-Baltic region and exercises 
of an offensive nature1. Within NATO, Germany 
wanted to strengthen the cooperative security 
pillar, i.e. political dialogue and cooperation in 
1 NATO’s crisis management operations and Germany’s 
participation in them were viewed as an ultimate solu-
tion – after the experiences connected with interven-
tions in Afghanistan and in Libya. Collective defence, cri-
sis response and cooperative security are NATO’s three 
main tasks, according to the NATO Strategic Concept 
adopted at the summit in Lisbon in 2010. 
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order to maintain regional and global security. 
Berlin was convinced that Germany and Europe 
should pursue a policy of dialogue and coopera-
tion towards Moscow, because “security in Eu-
rope is possible only with Russia, not against it”2. 
Berlin did not perceive any military threat from 
Moscow and believed that an increased NATO 
presence on the eastern flank would only con-
firm Russia in its claims of being encircled. 
Therefore, Berlin did not support or take part 
in any activity which Russia could present, and 
German society could interpret, as a return to 
Cold War confrontation3. Germany’s stance was 
best illustrated by the Bundeswehr’s minimal 
involvement in NATO’s exercise Steadfast Jazz 
2013. Organised in Poland and the Baltic states, 
the exercise was of high importance for the 
eastern allies since it was the first NATO field 
exercise4 based on a collective defence scenario 
in the region since the end of the Cold War and 
NATO’s eastward enlargement.
However, Germany’s stance on strengthening 
NATO’s eastern flank has evolved over the last 
two years, i.e. since the outbreak of the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian conflict. Berlin agreed to make 
collective defence a priority for NATO and con-
sented to a greater allied presence in Poland 
and the Baltic states. However, Germany con-
tinued to express reservations about the scope 
2 Coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD, 
Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten [Shaping Germany’s 
future], 16 December 2013, https://www.cdu.de/sites/
default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf
3 Justyna Gotkowska, ‘A weak link? Germany in the 
Euro-Atlantic security system’, OSW Point of View, 
15 January 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
point-view/2015-01-15/a-weak-link-germany-euro-at-
lantic-security-system
4 For more see: Wojciech Lorenz, “Steadfast Jazz 2013” 
– NATO odzyskuje równowagę, Biuletyn PISM nr 62, 
11 June 2013, http://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/
nr-62-1038
of NATO’s engagement. On the one hand, in the 
last two years Germany has ceased to perceive 
Russia a partner and begun instead to view it 
as “a challenge to the security of Europe”5. On 
the other hand, pressure by the USA, Poland 
and the Baltic states forced Germany to change 
its position on, and its contribution to NATO’s 
presence on the eastern flank. Berlin has grad-
ually expanded its military presence in Poland 
and the Baltic states also in order to maintain 
its credibility within the alliance. However, 
Germany continues to view its involvement as 
a reassurance to the allies and as a contribution 
to NATO’s coherence rather than a deterrence 
to Russia. Berlin still considers the possibility 
of Russia’s military attack on a NATO member 
state close to zero. Germany has not changed 
its conviction that “security in Europe is possi-
ble only with Russia, not against it” and that di-
alogue and cooperation with Moscow are nec-
essary. The policy of “deterrence and dialogue” 
was adopted as a double-track approach mod-
elled on NATO’s policy of the 1970s based on 
the Harmel Report6.
Germany’s support for strengthening NATO’s 
eastern flank is still limited by the fear of con-
frontation with Russia. The German paradigm 
differs radically from the Polish or the Baltic 
one, who view an insufficient NATO’s presence 
as an encouragement for Russia to take aggres-
sive measures leading to a limited confronta-
tion and aimed at a weak reaction by NATO or 
none at all. Germany considers the 1997 NATO- 
-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Dec-
5 These revolutionary – for German standards – provisions 
are included in the new strategic document on German 
security policy published in July 2016, See: The Feder-
al Government, White Paper on German Security Policy 
and the Future of the Bundeswehr, July 2016, https://
www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/en/ 
6 The report supported the implementation of a strategy 
based on two pillars: deterrence and détente. On the 
one hand, it proposed maintaining relevant military 
power and political solidarity, which are necessary to 
deter aggression and defend NATO’s territory. On the 
other hand, it attached equal importance to NATO’s de-
velopment of more stable political and economic rela-
tions with the USSR, which was intended to help resolve 
political problems. The opinion that military security 
and the policy of détente are not contradictory but com-
plementary, was of key importance.
Germany still views its involvement on 
the eastern flank in terms of reassuring 
its allies and maintaining credibility with-
in NATO, rather than deterring Russia.
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laration to be the instruments to limit NATO’s 
deterrence policy. These two documents con-
tain provisions limiting substantial permanent 
NATO forces in new eastern member states. 
Germany has used them as a quasi-legal argu-
ment in debates within NATO even though they 
are not legally binding and Russia has violat-
ed them thus significantly contributing to the 
deterioration of a change in European security.
From Germany’s perspective, the sine qua non 
of NATO’s strategy towards Russia involves 
a policy fostering dialogue with Russia. Ger-
many considers it necessary to maintain chan-
nels of political and military communication 
between NATO and Russia in order to avoid 
escalation of incidents, to support transpar-
ency and the predictability of actions by both 
sides and to ensure proper communication of 
NATO’s intentions. Germany views the NATO–
Russia Council (NRC) as a forum for this type of 
dialogue. It was on Germany’s request that the 
Council’s meeting was convened in April 2016 
after a two year hiatus7. Germany intends to 
develop dialogue with Russia not only within 
NATO, but also within the OSCE and in interna-
tional forums. Berlin considers it necessary to 
seek cooperation with Moscow in internation-
al security policy (a.o. Iran’s nuclear program, 
conflict resolution and fighting ISIS in Syria 
and Iraq, preventing the disintegration of state 
structures in Libya). Germany tries to encourage 
Russia to take part in devising solutions to in-
ternational security problems. This is intended 
7 The meeting has brought no results. Topics discussed 
included the conflict in Ukraine, transparency in the field 
of military operations, and Afghanistan. Germany sup-
ported the idea of convening another meeting ahead of 
the NATO Warsaw summit or immediately afterwards. 
to expand areas of cooperation and minimise 
areas of conflict and thereby to contribute to 
an improvement of NATO’s relations with Rus-
sia also in the area of European security. By 
promoting the dialogue with Russia, Germany 
often refers to the Harmel Report and consid-
ers it the beginning of the Western policy of 
détente towards the USSR, which, from Berlin’s 
perspective, triggered the end of the Cold War. 
Germany’s interpretation of history differs rad-
ically from the prevailing view in the countries 
of NATO’s eastern flank, according to which the 
Eastern Bloc’s economic problems, additional-
ly aggravated by the arms race with the USA, 
were at the root of the USSR’s demise.
With its change of course within NATO, Germa-
ny’s role in European security policy has been 
strengthened. The USA, which is in the process 
of rebalancing its policy to the Asia-Pacific and 
has been involved in military operations in the 
Middle East, wants its European allies to engage 
more resources to ensuring Europe’s security. 
The administration of President Barack Obama 
views Germany as a forthcoming leader of the 
European security policy, which should assume 
greater political and military responsibility in 
the face of Russia’s aggressive policy. The USA 
has withdrawn from playing a leading political 
role in the Russian-Ukrainian war and has del-
egated the task of conflict resolution to Ger-
many. Berlin has also become the USA’s main 
European partner in introducing and maintain-
ing economic sanctions against Russia. The USA 
is also putting pressure on Germany for Berlin 
to lead the military engagement of the Euro-
pean allies on the eastern flank. This tendency 
may intensify due to a future Brexit – the UK 
will need to focus on domestic problems and 
a possible break-up of its union, which may 
have a negative impact on the British military 
potential and on the scope of Britain’s involve-
ment on the eastern flank8. During the more 
than 25 years following reunification Germa-
8 The United Kingdom is the second largest European ally 
in terms of the scale of involvement on the eastern flank.
From Germany’s perspective, the sine qua 
non of NATO’s strategy towards Russia 
involves a policy fostering dialogue with 
Russia.
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ny’s political and economic importance in Eu-
rope has increased, and the role of France and 
that of Britain have weakened. Berlin now also 
wishes to boost its influence in the area of Eu-
ropean security policy9.
Considerable, non-controversial  
and quiet – the Bundeswehr’s presence 
on NATO’s eastern flank
Over the last two years, Germany’s status has 
evolved from that of a “big absent one” on NA-
TO’s eastern flank to that of a state with major 
involvement in the Baltic Sea region. Regardless 
of the assessment of the political motivation be-
hind Germany’s actions, this is a major change, 
considering Berlin’s domestic limitations.
In 2014, Germany was only militarily involved 
in measures reassuring its allies on the eastern 
flank10. The year 2015, however, brought in-
creased German involvement in the implemen-
tation of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which 
was adopted at the NATO summit in Wales11. 
In the process of adaptation of the NATO Re-
sponse Force (NRF), in 2015 Germany became 
a framework nation in the newly created Very 
High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The Bun-
deswehr assumed command of the land com-
ponent of the VJTF and set up its combat core 
9 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s New Global Role 
– Berlin steps up, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016, 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Pres-
se/Interviews/2016/160615_BM_ForeignAffairs.html
10 Germany became involved in NATO’s extended Baltic Air 
Policing mission (4 Eurofighter jets, September–December 
2014) and in the revived Standing NATO Mine Countermea-
sures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) operating in the Baltic Sea.
11 NATO, Readiness Action Plan, http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/topics_119353.htm#
in the form of a mechanised infantry battalion. 
Germany will serve as one of the six VJTF frame-
work nations again in 2019. Moreover, Germa-
ny, alongside Poland and Denmark, agreed to 
raise the rank of the headquarters of the Mul-
tinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin (MNC 
NE) and to increase its readiness. In the future, 
this will enable MNC NE to assume command 
over VJTF forces deployed on the eastern flank 
in case of a conflict. Germany has also become 
involved in reassurance measures towards its 
eastern allies. Berlin began sending one com-
pany (150–200 soldiers) for rotational three-
month presence to the Baltic states and Po-
land12. During 2015 this type of involvement of 
other European allies was much more limited. 
According to data from the German ministry of 
defence, in 2015 a total of around 5,200 Bunde-
swehr soldiers took part in exercises organised 
in the region13, which – along with the United 
Kingdom – was the most substantial military in-
volvement of the European members of NATO.
In 2016, Germany continued to be military en-
gaged on the eastern flank and will carry on this 
involvement in 2017. Bundeswehr companies 
rotate in the Baltic states and Poland14. For the 
first time, the German air force is to take part in 
a rotational presence on the eastern flank (aside 
from Baltic Air Policing, BAP) – it will deploy 
a deployable control and reporting centre in Lat-
via (July–September 2016). The Bundeswehr has 
also taken part in a series of exercises in Poland 
and the Baltic states ahead of the NATO summit 
in Warsaw (BALTOPS, Saber Strike, Anaconda) 
contributing around 1,750 soldiers (in terms of 
the number of soldiers involved it was ranked 
third after the USA – around 17,000 soldiers and 
the United Kingdom – around 1,850 soldiers). 
12 Lithuania: May–July 2015, Latvia: August–October 2015, 
Poland: October–December 2015.
13 Aside from the involvement of land troops, four German 
Eurofighter jets took part in Baltic Air Policing Mission 
(September–December 2015); moreover – similar to pre-
vious years – German warships operated in the Baltic Sea 
in the framework of the Standing NATO Mine Counter-
measures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) as well as in NATO, US, 
and multinational exercises.
14 Lithuania: April–June 2016, Estonia: July–October 2016, 
Poland: September–December 2016.
Over the last two years, Germany’s status 
has evolved from that of a ‘big absent one’ 
on NATO’s eastern flank to that of a state 
with major involvement in the Baltic Sea 
region.
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Germany (alongside the USA, the United King-
dom and Canada) will also become a framework 
nation responsible for forming one of the four 
battalion-sized battlegroups (each including 
800–1,000 soldiers) to be present on the east-
ern flank. Around 600 German soldiers along 
with the military equipment will be stationed in 
Lithuania on a rotational basis. Vilnius will thus 
become Germany’s major partner on the east-
ern flank. This collaboration will be intensified 
by military-technical cooperation due to Lithu-
ania’s purchase of German military equipment 
(21 used PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers, 
88 new Boxer infantry fighting vehicles).
Germany has pursued a special strategy in its 
military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. 
The involvement of the German air force has 
been the most limited (rotations within BAP and 
limited participation in exercises). The German 
army takes part in a large number of exercises, 
to which it contributes however rather smaller 
units (from 50 to 600 soldiers). Thus, the Bun-
deswehr marks its presence without emphasis-
ing it – unlike the United Kingdom or Denmark, 
which send large contingents of soldiers to se-
lected exercises (over 1,000 soldiers). The Ger-
man government is also sceptical about the or-
ganisation of large-scale land exercises on the 
eastern flank. It does not sidestep participation, 
but it does not emphasise its contribution ei-
ther. From Berlin’s perspective, this type of ex-
ercises is an unnecessary ‘show of force’ which 
may exacerbate the relations with Moscow and 
be interpreted in domestic debates Germany as 
NATO provocation. The German navy has been 
expanding its presence in the Baltic Sea, which 
was visible in this year’s BALTOPS naval exer-
cise. The navy points to the Baltic Sea as one 
of its strategic areas of involvement (ahead of 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean). 
From the German point of view, the maritime 
presence is the least controversial and the most 
obvious one since Germany has the largest na-
val potential in the region. Germany intends to 
combine its increased involvement in the Bal-
tic Sea with development of cooperation with 
partners in the region. Germany has offered 
to be the framework nation for multilateral 
operations in the Baltic Sea and has proposed 
a joint maritime headquarters to be established 
in Rostock15.
The crumbling consensus, a weak Bundes- 
wehr and energy dependency on Russia
Changes in the German have certain limita-
tions. Firstly, it is uncertain whether the con-
sensus reached by the Christian Democrats and 
the Social Democrats regarding NATO’s double 
track policy towards Russia will be sustained. In 
June 2016, the interview of the German foreign 
minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, for Bild am 
Sonntag, was widely understood as question-
ing the German government’s policy in NATO 
as agreed between the CDU/CSU and the SPD16. 
The Social Democrats have already launched 
their campaign ahead of the elections to the 
Bundestag (autumn 2017), in which foreign and 
security policy will be the main topic. The SPD 
15 Germany has proposed that a Baltic Maritime Coor-
dination Centre is to be established on the basis of 
Maritime Operations Centre within the structures of 
the German navy, which would serve as the maritime 
component command for multilateral operations in the 
Baltic Sea. See: A speech by Andreas Krause, German 
Inspector of the Navy, Wilhelmshavener Erklärung zur 
Zukunft der Deutschen Marine [Wilhelmshaven dec-
laration on the future of the German navy], 12 Febru-
ary 2016, http://www.marine.de/portal/a/marine/!ut/p/




16 Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Bild am Sonn-
tag, 19 June 2016, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/
EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2016/160619_BM_
Bild_am_Sonntag_engl_version.html
Germany has pursued a special strate-
gy in its military involvement on NATO’s 
eastern flank – the Bundeswehr takes 
part in numerous exercises; however, with 
relatively small forces.
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will want to present itself as a party of “peace 
and dialogue” in contrast to the “confronta-
tion-oriented” CDU. Emphasising the suprem-
acy of dialogue and cooperation with Russia 
over NATO’s policy of deterrance and criticising 
military exercises on the eastern flank (which 
the Bundeswehr took part in), Steinmeier not 
only indirectly criticised defence minister Ur-
sula von der Leyen (CDU) but also undermined 
the government’s strategy to slowly make Ger-
man public opinion accustomed to the Bundes- 
wehr’s involvement on NATO’s eastern flank. 
Moreover, statements by Steinmeier and Sig-
mar Gabriel, the SPD’s chairman and deputy 
chancellor, pave the way for a possible cen-
tre-left coalition composed of the SPD, the 
Green Party and the post-Communist Left Party 
to be formed after the elections in 201717. The 
Greens are internally divided, although the ma-
jority – which promotes human rights and sup-
ports democratic changes in Eastern European 
states – supports the government’s policy with-
in NATO, although it is rather demure in doing 
so. The Left Party however openly proposes the 
dissolution of NATO and the formation of a col-
lective security system with Russia’s participa-
tion, or at least would like Germany to leave 
the military structures of NATO. It opposes 
the policy of strengthening the eastern flank 
and the Bundeswehr’s participation in foreign 
operations. Forming a centre-left coalition of 
this kind would not be tantamount to meet-
ing the above-mentioned demands. However, 
17 This was suggested by the leader of SPD and depu-
ty chancellor in the present government. See Sigmar 
Gabriel, Im Schafspelz [In sheep’s clothing], Spie-
gel 25/2016, 18 June 2016, https://magazin.spiegel.
de/SP/2016/25/145417418/index.html?utm_source=-
spon&utm_campaign=vorab
it would trigger certain limitations in the poli-
cy Germany has thus far pursued within NATO, 
in the Bundeswehr’s involvement on the east-
ern flank and in defence spending. If the CDU 
formed a government with the FDP and/or with 
the Green Party, continuation of the current 
policy would be guaranteed but hampered by 
sharp criticism from the centre-left opposition 
and the anti-establishment party Alternative 
for Germany (AfD), which is critical of NATO 
and supports the idea of developing good re-
lations with Russia. Despite the fierce electoral 
campaign, another grand coalition of the CDU 
and SPD would be a guarantee that the present 
policy would be more or less maintained.
Aside from domestic political issues, the relative 
weakness of the German military will be main-
tained in the short- and mid-term perspective, 
which reduces Germany’s credibility and ambi-
tions to be a leader of European security policy, 
including on NATO’s eastern flank. The German 
armed forces in the last two years have been 
undergoing only minor changes to adapt to col-
lective defence operations. The present struc-
ture of the military is a result of a wide-ranging 
reform which has been implemented since 2011. 
It aimed to create budget savings and to adjust 
the Bundeswehr to performing asymmetrical 
crisis management operations. The reform 
has resulted in major cuts in the number of 
troops and in a reduction of arms and mili-
tary equipment mainly in the army and in the 
air force. Problems with military equipment 
were aggravated by intensive exploitation 
in foreign operations and by delays in the 
armaments projects. This causes limitations 
in the availability of equipment in full opera-
tional readiness. The best example of that were 
the problems with making one mechanised 
battalion as part of the land component of 
the VJTF in 2015 fully equipped and combat 
ready. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, com-
bined with the destabilisation of Europe’s 
southern neighbourhood, resulted in plans 
to increase defence spending and to amend 
the ongoing reform. The financial framework 
It is uncertain whether the consensus 
reached by the Christian Democrats and 
the Social Democrats regarding NATO’s 
policy towards Russia will be sustained.
7OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 217
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt  
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Małgorzata Zarębska  
TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz 
Co-operation: Nicholas Furnival 
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
for 2017–2020 provides for a gradual defence 
budget increase – from 34.2 billion euros in 
2016 to 39.1 billion euros in 2020. Despite 
this, Germany’s military spending will contin-
ue to oscillate between 1.1% and 1.3% of its 
GDP, and a portion of this spending will be 
earmarked for personnel costs which had pre-
viously been funded from a different budget 
line. By 2023, the ministry of defence plans to 
increase the number of soldiers by 7,000 and 
the number of civilian jobs by 4,400. It also 
plans to increase the number of armoured ve-
hicles (for example, to increase the number of 
Leopard 2 tanks from 225 to 320). According 
to unofficial information, the ministry of de-
fence itself has assessed the increased spend-
ing on arms and military equipment as being 
insufficient. This shortfall will not be compen-
sated by Germany’s efforts to develop military 
cooperation under the concept of framework 
nations18 or in pooling & sharing projects (the 
joint acquisition and use of capabilities).
Moreover, Germany’s energy dependence on 
Russia, to be intensified by the Nord Stream 
2 project is not being debated in the security 
18 The concept provides for the development of military 
capabilities in Europe in multinational clusters in which 
smaller nations would develop their capabilities in co-
operation and integration with a big framework nation. 
According to this concept, the Bundeswehr would be 
the core of regionally integrated military structures. For 
more see: Justyna Gotkowska, ‘Germany’s idea of a Euro-
pean army’, OSW Analyses, 25 March 2015, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-25/germa-
nys-idea-a-european-army
policy context in Berlin. Germany perceives the 
extension of the Nord Stream project by a sec-
ond gas pipeline (agreement signed in Septem-
ber 2015) mainly in economic terms – Germany 
wants to strengthen its position on the Europe-
an gas market. For Berlin the Nord Stream 1 and 
2 project support political cooperation with Rus-
sia and create interdependencies which exclude 
any confrontation between the two sides. For 
Moscow these projects serve as a foreign and 
security policy tool which may be used to apply 
pressure on Germany also in the case of a con-
flict between NATO and Russia. Nord Stream 2 
will also cause a reduction of main supply routes 
of Russian gas to the EU – from three (the Baltic 
route via Nord Stream, the Yamal route via Po-
land, the Brotherhood route via Ukraine) to two. 
Ukraine will lose the status of a key transit state 
and will de facto become an end recipient of 
Russian gas, which will weaken its position in all 
formats of talks with Russia. After the comple-
tion of Nord Stream 2, it will be Germany, who 
becomes the main transit state and the main re-
cipient of Russian gas in the EU. There is no de-
bate in Germany on how this increased depend-
ency on Russia may impact Germany’s security 
policy. From the perspective of the countries on 
NATO’s eastern flank, this may influence Germa-
ny’s credibility as an ally, and have an impact on 
Germany’s ambitions to play a leading role on 
NATO’s eastern flank, in European security policy 
and in military cooperation in Central and North-
ern Europe.
